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abstract 
 
Does the economy affect the electoral success of new political parties? Despite 
the profound scholarly interest on this subject, previous studies have not found 
consistent empirical evidence linking economic conditions to new party 
success. We argue in this thesis that the lack of compelling evidence derives 
from incorrectly drawn expectations about this precise relationship. By and 
large, previous scholars claim that bad economic conjunctures drive voters to 
support new political parties. This seems not always to be the case, however, 
as voters can punish incumbents for poor economic performance by supporting 
opposition parties instead. As such, we argue that new parties only benefit from 
bad economic conditions if voters are discontented with the existing parties as 
a whole. We tested this hypothesis drawing on a unique dataset that comprises 
all elections to the national legislatures in west European countries of the 
European Union, from 1986 to 2015. Statistical evidence appears to 
corroborate the aforementioned claim. Unfavorable economic conjunctures 
benefit new entrants if there is a large pool of discontented individuals. On the 
other hand, poor economic performance appears to slightly hamper their 
electoral success if voters are fairly satisfied with the existing parties. 
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novos partidos políticos, sucesso eleitoral, condições económicas, equilíbrio e 
falhas de mercado, comportamento eleitoral. 
 
resumo 
 
 
As condições económicas afectam o sucesso de novos partidos? Embora esta 
questão seja basilar para a Ciência Política, os estudos existentes não 
dispõem de evidência empírica concreta que corrobore uma relação entre os 
dois fenómenos. Nesta tese argumentamos que as expectativas teóricas 
destes estudos podem explicar, pelo menos parcialmente, estes resultados 
inconsistentes. Os estudos anteriores consideram em grosso modo que as 
más conjunturas económicas incentivam os eleitores a votar em novos partidos 
políticos. Estes eleitores podem, contudo, punir os incumbentes pelo mau 
desempenho económico apoiando os partidos da oposição. Deste modo, 
consideramos que as novas formações partidárias só beneficiam das más 
condições económicas quando os eleitores estão descontentes com todas as 
alternativas partidárias existentes, inclusive partidos de oposição. Esta 
hipótese foi testada com base em testes estatísticos em 135 eleições para os 
parlamentos nacionais dos países da Europa ocidental membros da União 
Europeia entre 1986 e 2015. Os resultados corroboram a hipótese anterior. Os 
períodos económicos mais desfavoráveis são benéficos para as novas 
formações partidárias caso haja um grande número de eleitores descontentes 
com as opções partidárias existentes. Por outro lado, o mau desempenho 
económico constrange, ainda que a um grau mais limitado, o sucesso eleitoral 
dos novos partidos quando os eleitores estão relativamente satisfeitos com os 
partidos estabelecidos. 
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1 Introduction
On December 20th 2015, Spanish voters went to the polls to elect their representa-
tives for the Congress of Deputies. The outcome of this electoral contest entailed a
fundamental shift in the national political landscape.
Since the early 1980s, two traditional mainstream political parties dominated the
Spanish party system, the Socialist Worker’s Party (PSOE) and the People’s Party
(PP) (Orriols & Cordero, 2016). Although some small (mostly regionally-based) par-
ties have managed to hold seats in the national and local legislatures, PSOE and PP
kept a pivotal role in governance in both levels of government (Rodon & Hierro, 2016;
Lancaster, 2017). Accordingly, Spain had a functional two-party system, with rela-
tively stable patterns of party competition and full alternations of power between the
aforementioned mainstream parties (Lancaster, 2017).
The outcome of the 2015 general election disrupted this status quo. A large number
of voters disenchanted with existing parties transferred their support to new party
alternatives. The main emerging contenders were Podemos, a left-wing populist party,
and Ciudadanos, a centrist, social liberal and market-oriented party (Lancaster, 2017).
Together, these newly formed competitors gathered almost 35 per cent of the vote
and obtained 109 of the 350 seats in the lower house. These unprecedented results
challenged the dominant position of PSOE and PP (Orriols & Cordero, 2016). The
electoral support for these parties dropped to just 51 per cent (down from the 84 per
cent in 2008), after the continuous electoral losses they experienced in general, local,
and European elections since 2011 (Rodon & Hierro, 2016).
The economic crisis that began in 2008 was perhaps one of the most prominent
factors in driving voters’ discontent with the mainstream parties. The Spanish economy
displayed some tenuous signs of recovery by the end of 2015. Nevertheless, this recovery
was still inconsequential compared to the cumulative economic losses since the onset
of the crisis (Orriols & Cordero, 2016). Crucially, the country still had some of the
highest unemployment rates among European countries at around 24 per cent (Rodon
& Hierro, 2016: 341), with approximately 90 per cent of new job contracts being
only temporary (Orriols & Cordero, 2016: 474). The lack of economic opportunities
generated a widespread discontent at the austerity programs pushed by PP, and the
then previous PSOE government, aimed at responding to the crises (Lancaster, 2017).
A series of corruption scandals further strengthened voters’ disenchantment with
these parties. These scandals involved bribes in exchange for awarding contracts, illegal
party-financing schemes, and misappropriation of public founds in regional governments
(Orriols & Cordero, 2016). The situation was so dire that, by November 2014, the
large majority of citizens considered corruption and fraud to be the most salient issue
in Spain (Orriols & Cordero, 2016).
Despite their ideological di↵erences, Podemos and Ciudadanos were able to capi-
talize on the general disenchantment of voters with the existing political parties. Both
developed a corruption-free public image and democratic internal procedures, and were
very critical of the established political class (Lancaster, 2017). They also proposed
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anti-austerity economic programs, which were particularly appealing to young voters
and the disenchanted middle class.
These anecdotal records illustrate the importance of studying the emergence of
new parties. On the one hand, new competitors may push to the political agenda the
demands of voters previously neglected by the existing parties. As such, even if the new
entrants fail to become relevant actors in government, their success still threatens the
existing parties. This forces the latter to adopt certain policies that otherwise would
not endorse (Hug, 2001; Meguid, 2005; Zons, 2015). On the other hand, the fleeting
success of new parties may impact the stability and functioning of the party system
and raise concerns about governability and responsiveness of the system (Zons, 2015).
Moreover, the Spanish case also exhibits some of the most prominent factors that
existing literature claims to favor new parties: voters’ discontent with existing parties
(Franzmann, 2011; Lago & Mart´ınez, 2011; Riera & Russo, 2016), and unfavorable
economic conjunctures (Hug, 2001; Tavits, 2007; Riera & Russo, 2016). Despite these
previous claims, extant studies have been unable to find a clear relationship between
economic conditions and new party emergence. This is particularly surprising given
that the economic voting literature has found compelling evidence linking the perfor-
mance of the economy to electoral outcomes (Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier, 2000; Van der
Brug et al., 2007).
Considering this mismatch between the theoretical claims and empirical findings
reported in extant literature, we seek to reassess the precise relationship between the
economy and the success of new parties. We claim that new political parties can only
benefit from bad economic conditions if there is a large number of discontented voters
with existing political parties. In contrast, the general state of the economy should
have no substantive impact on the electoral success of the new competitors if voters are
fairly satisfied with existing party alternatives. Under these circumstances, voters can
support opposition parties to punish the incumbents for poor economic performance
(Tavits, 2007). To test these claims, we structure this dissertation as follows.
In Chapter 2, we review existing studies about new party emergence. We first
explore the protracted debates on the criteria that define the term ‘new political party’.
Considering the conceptual problems of the previous definitions, we propose a novel
classification. This classification hinges on a framework about party lifespans developed
by Pedersen (1982), and considerations about party survival and electoral competition.
We also review the contributing factors of new party formation and initial success
previously identified in extant literature. By and large, these factors rest on three
broad explanatory dimensions: the impact of formal institutions; the characteristics
and interactions between political actors; and the input of voters.
In Chapter 3, we explore a novel theoretical approach to explain the electoral success
of new political parties. To this purpose, we first review extant theoretical models and
identify some shortcomings that potentially hinder their usefulness in describing the
aforementioned phenomenon. Taking these shortcomings into account, we develop a
demand side framework that specifies three key enabling factors of new party success:
the general economic conditions; the electoral demands of voters; and the strategic
concerns of voters. Hinging on this model, we then draw two hypotheses positing the
interactive influence of economic conditions and electoral demands on the electoral
success of new political parties.
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In Chapter 4, we outline the rationale for collecting and analyzing relevant data
to appropriately test our hypotheses. We first determine the basic unit of analysis
and the universe of observations that comprise our dataset. Then, we operationalize
the theoretical expectations outlined in the previous chapter. The ‘vote-share of new
political parties’ measures the electoral success of new entrants at any given election.
The ‘year-over-year changes in GDP per capita at purchasing power parity’ describe the
general state of the economy. The average ‘satisfaction with democracy’ and ‘turnout
levels’ assess the imbalances between electoral demands of voters and the o↵erings
of party competitors. Lastly, the ‘average magnitude of electoral districts’ and the
‘electoral volatility in previous elections’ weigh the strategic concerns of voters.
In Chapter 5, we test the previously posited hypotheses drawing on a unique dataset
that comprises 135 electoral contests for the lower-house national legislatures in 17
country members of the European Union, from 1986 to 2015. To this purpose, we use
four di↵erent specifications of a linear regression model fitted to panel data. We also
perform some regression diagnostic tests to check for multicollinearity, the robustness
of the interaction e↵ect in the presence of potential cofounders, as well as the impact
of unobserved heterogeneity at the country level in the final model.
Our findings strongly suggest that the e↵ect of economic conditions on the success
of new political parties depends on the overall discontent of voters towards existing
parties. Indeed, new entrants seem to benefit from unfavorable economic conditions if
voters are dissatisfied with the way democracy works. However, our tests also portray
some counterintuitive findings, suggesting that economy growth actually helps new
parties to achieve electoral success when satisfaction with democracy is high.
3
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2 Literature Review
‘Why do new parties emerge?’ Existing studies have developed an extensive body of
research attempting to answer this question. These studies have nevertheless been
unable to settle a definitive classification for the object of study: new political parties.
To classify new political parties it is required to define what is a political party in
the first place. Developing such a definition is not a straightforward task, however.
On the one hand, parties may display motivations, behavioral patterns, and organiza-
tional features remarkably similar to those of other political actors, such as political
associations, grass-roots movements, and interest organizations (Lucardie, 2000: 178).
On the other hand, political parties may themselves be quite distinct in these same
aspects (Katz, 2011: 220).
Despite these di↵erences, some authors have proposed minimal definitions that have
since become quite influential in political science. These definitions dispose of any
proprieties and characteristics that are not indispensable for labeling a political party
(Sartori, 1976: 55), such as the types of actors that constitute them, their role in the
political process, as well as their motivations, behavior, organizational features (White,
2006). Rather, they generally hinge on considerations about electoral competition.
Sartori (1976: 57) provided one of the most prominent definitions in the literature. The
author defines political parties as “any political group that presents at elections, and
is capable of placing, through elections, candidates for public o ce”. Riggs (1968: 51),
in turn, proposed a similar definition, describing a political party as “any organization
which nominates candidates for election to an elected assembly”.
Studies about new political parties adopt similar definitions. Although the exact
wording varies slightly, they classify political parties as political organizations that
appoint candidates to elections (e.g. Willey, 1998; Hug, 2001; Bolin, 2007; Tavits,
2007). The ubiquity of this definition in extant literature largely results from concerns
about the feasibility of empirical research, as electoral records are easily obtainable
while other criteria may pose more challenges for researchers to identify the universe
of potential political organizations that fit into such a definition (Pedersen, 1982: 5).
2.1 Defining ’new political party’
Still, extant literature has yet to settle on a single uncontested definition of ‘new
political party’ (Barnea & Rahat, 2011). Two reasons underlie the lack of a univocal
classification. First, the criteria that define new electoral competitors. Second, the
circumstances of formation of genuinely new political parties. We review these reasons
in the two following sections.
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2.1.1 Distinguishing the new from the old
The existing literature sets forth four di↵erent criteria to classify new electoral com-
petitors. The first rests on the idea that new competitors introduce or, at the very
least, respond to salient new issues that have been previously neglected by existing
parties (Willey, 1998: 657). This view implies that new electoral competitors must
add a new dimension of political conflict to the party system and, consequently, stir
observed patterns of party competition (Harmel, 1985: 405). This classification poses
a fundamental problem, though. It relies on programatic o↵erings of party contestants,
and thus excludes by default purely o ce-seeking parties (Strøm, 1990).
The second criterion hinges on key historical events to di↵erentiate new electoral
competitors from existing parties (Bolin, 2007: 7). Events like World War II or the
post-industrial revolution of de 1970s trigger an appreciable shift in the political en-
vironment that impel new electoral competitors to develop distinctive organizational
characteristics as well as novel programmatic and mobilization strategies (Harmel, 1985;
Golder, 2003). Still, this criterion does not account for party change in response to new
electoral demands and political environment (Mair, 1993; Katz & Mair, 1995; Ignazi,
1996; Litton, 2015; Emanuele & Chiaramonte, 2016). As a result, it remains unclear
the extent to which new competitors actually develop contrastive characteristics to
those of existing party competitors.
The third criterion regards new electoral competitors as comprising all party con-
testants that did not take part of the original party system (Harmel, 1985; Willey,
1998). According to this view, these new competitors, at the very least, change the
supply of party o↵erings in electoral contests (Harmel, 1985: 405-406). This classi-
fication is not without its drawbacks, however. The newness of party contestants is
conceptually bounded to the own definition of the original party system. This concept
is di cult to operationalize by itself, especially considering that predictive patterns of
party competition gradually emerge over the course of the first few elections (Sartori,
1976). Lacking an obvious reference point to determine the time-interval of what may
be regarded the ‘original party system’, this criterion requires setting a discretionary
cuto↵ point that may arbitrarily influence which party contestants are classified as new
electoral competitors.
Lastly, the fourth criterion considers new electoral competitors to encompass all
party contestants that compete at an election for the first time (Hug, 2001; Tavits,
2007, 2008a). This definition provides a more straightforward approach to classify
new electoral competitors. It is, therefore, more commonly employed in state-of-art
literature (e.g. Hug, 2001; Bolin, 2007; Tavits, 2007, 2008a; Litton, 2015; Kselman et
al., 2016; Mainwaring et al., 2017). Still, it is unclear why these scholars ascribe the
newness of parties only during the first election in which they compete, as it may
not necessarily mark a major milestone for these contenders (Pedersen, 1982). New
competitors may remain outside of the party system with low electoral support and
visibility, lacking mature organizational structures that resemble those of established
party structures (Bolleyer & Bytzek, 2013; Deschouwer, 2008).
Taking these shortcomings into account, we propose a new criterion that rests on
one of the major milestones for political parties Pedersen (1982) identified in his sem-
inal study about party lifespans: getting parliamentary representation. Parliamentary
representation allows political parties to get certain public subsidies, access informa-
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tion, and influence policy within electoral channels either in government or on the
parliament. Parliamentary representation also increases the visibility of the new en-
trants and informs the electorate of their viability at subsequent elections. These are
valuable resources that enhance the ability of the new competitors to consolidate their
organizational structures and role in the party system (Pedersen, 1982: 7). As such, we
believe that the threshold of representation is an appropriate cuto↵ point to distinguish
new electoral competitors from the remaining existing party contestants.
2.1.2 Circumstances of formation of genuinely new parties
Not all new electoral competitors are genuinely new political parties, though. This
assertion underpins the second issue in explaining the general disagreement about the
definition of new political parties, their circumstances of formation. New electoral
competitors may either emerge from start-up organizations with no prior link to already
existing parties (Bolleyer & Bytzek, 2013; Emanuele & Chiaramonte, 2016), or from
splits, mergers, electoral alliances, and reorganizations of former parties (Harmel &
Robertson, 1985; Mair, 1999; Bolin, 2007). Existing literature generally regards start-
up organizations as genuinely new political parties. Studies do not usually consider
coalitions and reorganizations of existing competitors to be genuinely new parties,
however.
Scholars have diverging views about splits and mergers. Most cross-national re-
searchers regard start-up organizations and minor splits of existing party contestants
as genuinely new political parties (e.g. Hug, 2001; Bolin, 2007; Tavits, 2007, 2008a;
Zons, 2015). This classification is pretty straightforward. However, these authors fail
to bring forward any theoretical reason justifying why splits are regarded as new parties
whereas mergers are not.
Other authors, however, recognize the nuanced nature of these circumstances of
formation and propose detailed criteria to identify which new competitors are genuinely
new political parties. These criteria broadly hinge on the novelty of the labels of new
entrants (Birch, 2003); the matureness of their organizational structures (Bolleyer &
Bytzek, 2013); and the past connections of their members to existing parties and past
democratic politics (Barnea & Rahat, 2011; Sikk, 2005). Employing these criteria in
a cross-national design is nervertheless not particularly attainable, especially when no
information is available about smaller parties.
As such, we used the same criteria commonly found in cross-national research,
distinguishing the di↵erent circumstances of formation in terms of their theoretical net
impact on electoral competition. Organizations with no prior link to existing parties
and smaller parts of a split are regarded as new political parties. These circumstances
of formation increase the net number of competitors within the electoral market. The
new entrants ride on perceived market failures in an attempt to mobilize voters, either
for policy- or o ce-seeking motives (Franzmann, 2011; Lago & Mart´ınez, 2011).
In contrast, reorganizations of former parties, electoral alliances and mergers are
regarded as existing parties. These circumstances of formation are either a strategy to
maximize electoral gains or the consequence of adaptational pressures to new electoral
demands and political environments (Ignazi, 1996; Mair, 1990, 1993). In other words,
these circumstances of formation are a survival mechanism or an attempt to prevent
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potential market failures in the first place. These kind of strategic decisions encourage
the cartelization of party competition, inherently opposing the view that new political
parties emerge as a response of failures in the electoral market, and that they desta-
bilize established patterns of party competition (Harmel & Robertson, 1985; Lago &
Mart´ınez, 2011).
2.2 Why do new political parties emerge?
During the 1960s and 1970s, party systems in advanced democracies seemed to conform
to the ‘freezing hypothesis’ developed by Lipset & Rokkan (1967). Structural political
cleavages played a pivotal role in determining electoral outcomes. As a result, patterns
of party competition were highly stable (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967). However, this equi-
librium came under strain as partisanship dealignment started to increase since the
end of the 1970s (Dalton et al., 2000; Riera & Russo, 2016). As a result, new political
competitors became increasingly able to mobilize a growing pool of voters that seems
detached from their traditional vote choices. Consequently, the emergence of new po-
litical parties has since then become a relatively common phenomenon in established
democracies (Emanuele & Chiaramonte, 2016). Left-libertarian and extreme right-
wing political parties emerged in the electoral scene of several western democracies
in the last two decades of the twentieth century (Rohrschneider, 1993; Mudde, 2014).
Regionalist, anti-establishment, and business-firm parties also achieved considerable
electoral support since the turn of the century in some European countries (De Winter
& Tu¨rsan, 1998; Abedi, 2002).
These events led to the development of a new strand of political science literature
that has its core concern explaining the formation and success of new political par-
ties. We split seven of the most prominent factors into into three main explanatory
dimensions: institutions, supply-side, and demand side-factors.
2.2.1 Institutional Perspective
The first main explanatory dimension focuses on the influence of formal institutions
in explaining new party emergence. Extant literature analyzes the influencing role of
three prominent institutional characteristics of political systems: the electoral system,
political system, and other formal rules of party formation and electoral competition.
Permissiveness of electoral systems
The permissiveness of electoral systems a↵ect the electoral viability of new political
parties. Highly constraining electoral rules generate incentives for strategic voting, that
benefit existing parties with proven viability records (Cox, 1997; Tavits, 2007). This
hinders the likelihood of voter recoordination favoring new competitors. By extension,
permissive electoral rules allow smaller parties to become viable contenders. This not
only improves their chances of electoral success but encourages strategic entry decisions
as well.
This argument is perhaps the most ubiquitous theoretical expectation in extant
literature. Existing studies have relied on numerous indicators of electoral permis-
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siveness to test this claim. These include the type of electoral system (proportional,
mixed, and majoritarian) (e.g. Harmel & Robertson, 1985; Hauss & Rayside, 1978;
Powell & Tucker, 2014); proportionality of electoral formulas (e.g. Hino, 2012; Ksel-
man et al., 2016); district magnitudes (e.g. Willey, 1998; Bolin, 2007; Tavits, 2007;
Powell & Tucker, 2014; Kselman et al., 2016); legal thresholds (e.g. Bolin, 2007); and
e↵ective thresholds (e.g. Bolin, 2007; Hug, 2000; Lago & Mart´ınez, 2011).
Still, despite the ubiquity of these claims, empirical findings remain somewhat
mixed (Selb & Pituctin, 2010). To be sure, the aforementioned individual indicators
are not comprehensive measures of the permissiveness of electoral rules as a whole.
This may explain the inconsistent evidence reported in the extant literature (Selb &
Pituctin, 2010).
Formal characteristics of political systems
Some other institutional characteristics of political systems may also a↵ect the electoral
viability of new political parties as well as determining the potential benefits of holding
o ce. The first of these features is the degree of centralization of government. Several
authors argue that highly decentralized governments increase the opportunities for the
emergence of new political parties by allowing them to prove their electoral viability
at lower levels of the political system before competing at national elections (Willey,
1998; Lucardie, 2000; Hug, 2001). Nonetheless, others argue that centralized systems
grant more benefits of holding governmental o ce, and thus increase the chance for
the emergence of new parties representing strong electoral demands (Hug, 2001).
The second feature is the type of political regime. Several scholars argue that pres-
idential systems reduce the likelihood of success of new parties. Presidential systems
promote electoral competition around two large party contestants (Lucardie, 2000).
Further, they reduce the benefits of holding o ce, as presidential systems e↵ectively
split policy-making power across independently accountable legislatures and executives
(Willey, 1998). On the other hand, other scholars argue that presidential regimes may
actually increase the chance for new party emergence because they encourage popular
elected politicians to form new political parties without any organizational backing
(Mainwaring et al., 2017).
Empirical evidence does not provide any conclusive findings supporting these the-
oretical claims (e.g. Willey, 1998; Hug, 2001; Mainwaring et al., 2017). This is not
particularly surprising, though, as previous literature has identified conflicting causes
that drive its relationship with new party success in opposite directions.
Formal rules of party formation and electoral competition
Electoral procedures and laws define the formal costs of party formation and electoral
competition. The former specify the requirements for ballot access (Bolin, 2007), gen-
erally consisting of monetary fees and a certain number signatures required to register
a new political party (Hug, 2000, 2001; Tavits, 2007, 2008a). These rules increase only
party formation costs, and thus have no meaningful impact on their subsequent suc-
cess (Harmel & Robertson, 1985; Hug, 2000). The rules of electoral competition, on
the other hand, a↵ect both the formation and success of the new parties. These rules
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include eligibility and distribution of public funding, subsidies among electoral com-
petitors, as well as financial limitations to campaign spending and media access (Hug,
2000; Bolin, 2007; Hino, 2012). These rules regulate party competition during electoral
contests. New political parties generally lack the resources available to existing parties
to promote their candidacy among the electorate. Rules that impose little cost to new
entrants are then detrimental to their success (Bolin, 2007). In contrast, constraining
rules increase competition costs, hindering incentives for party entry as well as their
subsequent electoral viability.
Compelling empirical evidence is still lacking to draw any definite inference about
the impact of these rules on new party emergence. Tavits (2007) reports supporting
findings for the impact of petition signatures on new party formation, and Bolin (2007)
for campaign spending limitations on the emergence of new parties. Nonetheless, both
authors were unable to find supporting evidence for the role of elibiligy of public fund-
ing. This joins other studies that have also failed to link the aforementioned variables
to new party formation (see Harmel & Robertson, 1985; Hug, 2000, 2001). This is
partly due to the vastly distinct regulations in force in di↵erent political systems. As
a result, the precise impact of these rules on the formation of new parties remains
di cult to assess, requiring a more detailed outline of these frameworks (Bolin, 2007).
2.2.2 Supply-side factors
The second main explanatory dimension hinges on a supply-side perspective. This
perspective focuses on the characteristics of political systems, as well as iterated and
institutionalized interactions between di↵erent political actors within them. The new
party literature identifies three particularly influential supply-side factors.
Characteristics of party systems
Scholarly interest focuses on two main aspects of party systems that appear to a↵ect
the emergence of new parties. First, the degree of institutionalization of party sys-
tems. Predictive patterns of party competition allow voters and political parties to de-
velop consistent beliefs about the strategies of other actors within the electoral market
(Gehlbach, 2013). This reduces uncertainty, allowing existing parties to more e↵ec-
tively channel electoral demands, and voters to develop accurate expectations about
the viability of available party alternatives (Lago & Mart´ınez, 2011; Tavits, 2007).
Accordingly, highly institutionalized party systems appear to substantially reduce the
likelihood for the formation and success of new parties. Scholars have found com-
pelling empirical evidence supporting this claim, relying on proxy measures, such as
age of democracy (Lago & Mart´ınez, 2011; Tavits, 2007) and age of party systems
(Bischo↵, 2013).
Second, party system fragmentation. Scholars advance two contending theoretical
expectations to this regard. Some suggest that fragmentation reduces opportunities
and electoral viability of new entrants, as a large number of political parties can more
easily respond to existing dimensions of political conflict and fleeting issues (Harmel &
Robertson, 1985; Mu¨ller-Rommel, 1993). By and large, formal models of party entry
support this argument. Both entry-deterrence dispersion and citizen-candidate models
imply that entry opportunities of potential candidates are, at least to some extent,
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limited to the availability of unoccupied policy-space, which tends to be scarcer as the
number of electoral competitors grows (Downs, 1957; Gehlbach, 2013).
Others argue, however, that party system fragmentation actually increases the like-
lihood of new party emergence. The proponents of this claim consider that fragmented
party systems generally hint at a more permeable electoral market (Mainwaring et al.,
2017) that features lower entry barriers for potential new competitors. Interestingly,
some recent contributions of formal party entry models also follow a similar argument
(Kselman & Tucker, 2011; Kselman et al., 2016). They assert that new parties have
a greater impact over their preferred policy outcomes in fragmented party systems.
New electoral competitors prompt voters to reallocate their ballot choices from ex-
isting parties that share close policy positions to them (Downs, 1957; Tavits, 2008b).
In multi-party systems, this pulls the expected policy outcomes closer to their ideal
point (Kselman et al., 2016: 322), by allowing the new competitors to have a greater
leverage in policy decision-making and coalition formation (Sartori, 1976; Kselman et
al., 2016). Conversely, in a highly polarized two-party systems, the relocation of votes
may cause the most distant large party to achieve a plurality win, as the new entrant
cannibalizes the electoral support of its closest large party (Kselman et al., 2016: 321-
322). Strategic entry decisions in this latter scenario then can potentially lead to less
preferred policy outcomes. Empirical evidence appears to strongly support the claim
that fragmented party systems are more inviting to new parties (Kselman et al., 2016;
Mainwaring et al., 2017).
Role of non-electoral political organizations in decision-making
The role of non-electoral political organizations in decision-making shapes the policy-
making benefits of holding o ce. By extension, “the degree of policy change allowed
only via electoral channels” (Tavits, 2007: 104) a↵ects the potential policy-making
benefits of new contestants. These benefits are higher under pluralist systems of in-
terest representation. Under such arrangements, “the parliament and the government
remain the main arenas for conflict resolution between di↵erent interests” (Tavits, 2007:
105). This allows political parties to have monopolistic control over policy formation.
Therefore, these systems encourage non-electoral political organizations such as in-
terest groups, unions, social movements, and non-governmental organizations to form
political parties and participate in electoral contests. Concomitantly, these benefits
are lower under corporatist arrangements. These systems of interest representation
integrate these organizations in the policy-making process. Political groups may then
prefer to influence policy-making outside of the electoral channels, as they can e↵ec-
tively bypass the costs party formation and electoral competition while maintaining a
relatively strong influence. Existent empirical evidence appears to support this theo-
retical claim (Tavits, 2007; Hino, 2012).
Resources available to propective new parties
Participating in elections is costly (Hug, 1996; Cox, 1997; Gehlbach, 2013). As such, the
resources available to potential electoral contestants significantly impact their strategic
entry decisions (Tavits, 2007). They also inform voters about their viability (Lucardie,
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2000: 179). Consequently, available resources play an important role in explaining
both the formation and success of new parties.
Previous studies have identified several types of resources that facilitate new party
breakthrough. These include monetary resources, strong charismatic leadership, media
attention, consolidated organizational structures, and support from important political
and social groups and organizations (Hauss & Rayside, 1978; Lucardie, 2000; Bolleyer
& Bytzek, 2013). Empirical evidence suggests that the role of these resources varies
according to the type of new electoral contestants. For instance, close ties with im-
portant social groups seems to significantly increase the success of left-libertarian new
political parties (Kitschelt, 1988; Mu¨ller-Rommel, 1993). On the other hand, charis-
matic leadership appears to be key resource for the success of new extreme right-wing
and regionalist parties (De Winter & Tu¨rsan, 1998; Carter, 2011).
2.2.3 Demand-side factors
Finally, the third main explanatory dimension hinges on a demand-side perspective.
This perspective focuses on the factors that impact the propensity of voters to support
new political parties. Previous studies have identified two demand-side determinants
that drive voting behavior towards new entrants.
Emergence of new issues
New issues generate new electoral demands. Existing parties decide whether to respond
to them. If they ignore or fail to respond to salient demands, voters may decide to
switch their support to new political parties that do attempt to answer them (Hauss
& Rayside, 1978; Hug, 2001; Meguid, 2005; Tavits, 2007).
This argument has been particularly influential to scholars of left-libertarian and ex-
treme right-wing political parties. They stress the role of increasing post-materialistic
values (e.g. Inglehart, 1990; Rohrschneider, 1993), the salience of nuclear energy con-
troversy and pollution problems (e.g. Kitschelt, 1988, 1989), the size of the welfare
state and structural economic development (e.g. Kitschelt & McGann, 1997; Mu¨ller-
Rommel, 1998), and increases in immigrant population and asylum applications (e.g.
Kitschelt & McGann, 1997; Van der Brug et al., 2005) in providing opportunity pulls
for the emergence of these types of parties.
Some scholars criticize this earlier body of research, arguing that it generally disre-
gards the answers of existing parties towards new electoral demands. They propose new
indicators to measure the extent to which parties respond to fleeting issues. Meguid
(2005) emphasizes the tactics that existing parties employ to respond to issues raised
by left-libertarian and extreme right-wing parties. The author finds that supporting
and prioritizing these issues hinders the success of the new entrants. In turn, Selb
& Pituctin (2010) compares the voting recommendations of existing parties to those
of a new competitor, the Swiss Green Party (SGP), during referenda in Switzerland.
They find that the new competitor achieves greater success in constituencies in which
existing parties took diverging referenda positions than those of the SGP.
Despite the strong empirical findings, these indicators su↵er from a major draw-
back. Using them requires focusing on responses to specific issues or in a particular
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Type of study Supporting findings No supporting findings
Cross-national studies Hug (2001)
Tavits (2007)
Zons (2015)
Kselman et al. (2016)
Table 2.1: The impact of economic conditions on the formation of new parties in
western democracies – overview of the statistical findings in the extant literature
Type of study Supporting findings No supporting findings
Cross-national studies Mainwaring et al. (2017) Kselman et al. (2016)
Intra-national studies Riera & Russo (2016)
Rosenstone et al. (1996)
Eagles & Erfle (1993)
Studies on populist and
extreme right-wing
parties
Mu¨ller-Rommel (1998)
Knigge (1998)
Golder (2003)
Van der Brug et al. (2005)
Jackman & Volpert (1996)
Studies on
left-libertarian and
regionalist parties
Mu¨ller-Rommel (1998)
Hearl et al. (1996)
Table 2.2: The impact of economic conditions on the success of new parties in western
democracies – overview of the statistical findings in the extant literature
institutional context. Therefore, these measures are not particularly useful in cross-
national studies, as they analyze di↵erent political systems and a myriad of new party
organizations with diverging ideological motivations and policy positions. Hence, state-
of-art literature instead relies on measures of the size electoral market failures (such as
turnout) to weigh imbalances between electoral demands of voters and policy o↵erings
of existing parties (e.g. Lago & Mart´ınez, 2011; Zons, 2015; Riera & Russo, 2016).
Economic conditions
The impact of economic conditions on voting behavior has been extensively documented
in the economic voting literature (Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier, 2000; Van der Brug et al.,
2007). Studies about new political parties follow a similar rationale, claiming that
poor economic performance increases the pool of dissatisfied voters. This encourages
potential new parties to compete at elections and allows them to mobilize greater
electoral support (Herna´ndez & Kriesi, 2016).
Strong theoretical expectations notwithstanding, existing research has reported in-
consistent supporting empirical evidence. Table 2.1 and Table 2.2 provide an overview
of extant findings in previous studies. Cross-national studies report inconclusive results
regarding the impact of macroeconomic conditions on the emergence of new parties in
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western democracies. This pattern holds for the success of these new competitors in
intra-national research. Empirical evidence is more encouraging, but still not definite,
in studies about specific types of political parties, though. This mixed evidence blurs
the establishment of a clear causality chain. Nonetheless, a more careful review of this
body of research reveals some interesting insights about the potential causes that drive
those inconclusive findings.
Riera & Russo (2016) shows that impact of unemployment rates in the success
of Podemos increases as the size of market imbalances grows. They find that not to
be the case with the success of Movimento 5 Stelle, however. Instead, the influence of
unemployment rates in this instance appears to be higher in municipalities with a young
population. In turn, Golder (2003) discovers that unemployment increase the electoral
support for neofascist parties, while having no significant e↵ect on the vote-share of
other populist right-wing parties. Lastly, Mu¨ller-Rommel (1998) finds the electoral
success of extreme right-wing parties to be driven by poor economic conditions, whereas
the success of left-libertarian parties is actually associated with economic growth and
low unemployment.
The three studies then suggest that the impact of economic conditions on the emer-
gence of new parties are conditioned on other factors, such the characteristics of both
political parties and the demands of the electorate. Hence, we believe that the incon-
sistent findings reported in the literature may result from misspecification in empir-
ical models, drawn from inaccurate theoretical depictions of the precise relationship
between economic conditions and the emergence of new parties. We expand this argu-
ment further in the following chapter, when depicting the impact of several enabling
factors on the success of new parties.
14
3 Theorizing the Electoral
Success of New Parties
The theoretical foundations of the literature on new parties trace back to several
case studies about emerging political parties in western democracies (e.g. Nagle, 1970;
Pinard, 1971; Spini, 1972; Fisher, 1974; Jaensch, 1976; Hauss, 1978; Hauss & Rayside,
1978; Berrington, 1979; Mu¨ller-Rommel, 1982). This initial body of research adopted
exploratory research designs. The primary concern of these studies was to determine
why new parties were emerging in previously-frozen party systems. They found fleeting
issues and shifting political cleavages to be crucial enabling factors for the success of
these parties. Hauss & Rayside (1978), in one of the most seminal case studies in these
first studies, adding that political and institutional facilitators also play a critical role
in determining the electoral fate of the new parties.
The cumulative findings of these studies laid the groundwork for the development
of explanatory models of new party emergence. Hinging on previous research, Harmel
& Robertson (1985) attempted to develop such a model. The authors argued that
the emergence of these parties results from a series of social, political, and structural
factors. They labeled the numerous enabling factors suggested in previous studies under
this classification, and tested a set of hypotheses positing the relationship among them
and the formation and success of new parties.
While departing from the predominant exploratory trend of previous research, their
framework still lacked a theoretical foundation that clearly details how the enabling
factors interact with each other (Hug, 1996: 171). Therefore, the authors merely
streamlined the prior developments in the literature into a tripartite classification of
enabling factors. As such, their study still lacked a systematic understanding about
the underlying logic behind the emergence of new political parties (Hug, 2001; Tavits,
2007).
3.1 Existing models of new party emergence
Hug (1996, 2001) attempted to fill this theoretical gap in the then extant literature.
Hinging on formal theoretical models of strategic behavior and party entry, the author
developed a four-stage signaling game that depicts the interactions between an existing
party and a potential new contender.1 This game occurs under imperfect information.
The existing party ignores the electoral support the potential candidate might get in
future elections. The new candidate signals its strength to the existing party through
a series of political demands. The existing party may accept or reject those demands,
considering the costs to respond to them, the potential strength of the new contender
1See Hug (1996) and Gehlbach (2013) for a more extensive overview of formal models
of strategic behavior and party entry.
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and the institutional and political constraints that may hinder the its success. If the
existing party accepts the demands, the potential candidate refrains from forming a
new party. Conversely, if the party rejects them, the new contender may choose to
compete at the next election, if it expects electoral success. In general terms, then,
the formation of new political parties results from existing parties underestimating the
actual strength of potential new contenders and their demands.
This model primarily deals with the formation of new political parties. Nevertheless,
Hug argues that his theoretical framework is able to provide some insights about their
initial success. While the author is well aware there is a conceptual distinction between
the new party formation and success, he recognizes that both phenomena share a close
relationship. The decision to compete at elections hinges on the expected success of
political parties. In turn, new parties cannot achieve electoral success if they do not
compete at elections in the first place (Hug, 2000, 2001).
This close relationship appears in the theoretical expectations developed by Tavits
(2007). Following theory of strategic entry (see Cox, 1997), the author hypothesizes
that the formation of new parties rests upon the strategic choices of o ce-seeking
political entrepreneurs. They choose to compete at elections when the benefits of
getting elected are higher than the costs of electoral participation, taking into account
the probability of getting electoral support.
Kselman et al. (2016), in turn, attempted to depict the conditions that allow policy-
seeking parties to emerge. The authors argue that the decision to form a new party
hinges on a maximizing behavior of potential new candidates. These candidates eval-
uate the expected policy consequences in competing at an election, considering the
positions of existing parties in the policy space. They decide to compete if the ex-
pected election results lead to a more-preferred policy outcome than those associated
with the status quo (Kselman et al., 2016: 320).
Finally, Zons (2015) attempted to depict how the programmatic supply of existing
parties a↵ects the formation of new competitors. He argues that the programmatic
diversity of existing parties determine the extent to which new entrants are able to
introduce “new ways to think about politics” and promote new issues (Zons, 2015:
921). These programmatic innovations allow new parties to respond to the demands
of unsatisfied voters and, therefore, achieve some electoral success. Then, according to
this rationale, the programmatic diversity of existing parties structure the incentives
for new party formation. Relatively uniform programmatic o↵erings provide better
electoral opportunities for new competitors that introduce some kind of programmatic
innovation in the political agenda.
3.1.1 Shortcomings of existing cross-national models
These theoretical frameworks all share several common features. They draw onto the
micro foundations of formal models of strategic behavior, strategic entry, and spacial
competition. As a result, they depict strong theoretical expectations about the for-
mation of new parties, emphasizing the role of strategic decisions of political actors
in this process. In general terms, these actors decide to compete at an election when
they expect to be electorally successful. Thus, these models assume, either explicitly
or implicitly, that the formation and the success of new parties are two distinct but
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interlinked phenomena (Zons, 2015). Along these lines, they are able to provide some
insights about the latter. We argue, however, that these insights are insu cient to
provide a thorough understanding about the success of these parties.
Two major shortcomings underlie this claim. First, empirical data suggest a ques-
tionable link between the formation and success of new parties, contrary to what these
models portray. We tested this relationship on a sample of 1668 new political parties
that comprise our database, using entry of these competitors on national legislatures
as a categorial measure of electoral success. We found that 59 of new party competi-
tors (roughly 3.5 per cent) were able to place at least one candidate in the legislature
in the first electoral contest in which they participated. In turn, 28 new parties (1.7
per cent) only achieved national representation after iterated attempts, going as far
as seven.2 The majority of new political parties (around 95 per cent) never managed
to enjoy successful electoral outcomes. In total, 1182 failed to win a seat at the first
time they compete in national elections and refrained from entering further electoral
contests. Finally, 399 participated in subsequent contests irrespectively of the past
electoral outcomes.
These findings suggest two important considerations about new competitors. Some
seem to be interested in long-term payo↵s or non-electoral goals, such as pushing a
particular issue to the political agenda (Willey, 1998; Lucardie, 2000). Several others
appear to miscalculate electoral outcomes. These two considerations challenge the
claim that the decision to participate in elections hinges on the prospect of immediate
electoral success.
Admittedly, a supply side approach may endogenize these considerations into fu-
ture theoretical models. However, models following such an approach still display a
fundamental drawback: they only provide an indirect rationale about the success of
new parties. Focusing on the strategic decisions of political actors, these theoretical
frameworks disregard (at least to some extent) the input of voters, the actors that
directly determine the electoral success of these parties. As a result, these models fail
to carefully depict how the numerous factors that a↵ect voting choices may provide
electoral opportunities for new political parties. We believe that a demand side ratio-
nale provides a more parsimonious and thorough approach to depict this phenomenon.
This approach allows for a precise description of how each of the determinants of voting
behavior a↵ect the success of new parties, and how they interact with each other.
In spite of the advantages of such an approach in explaining the electoral success
of new political parties, it still remains underdeveloped in the cross-national literature.
Therefore, attempt to address this gap in the literature with a demand-side theoretical
model. We develop this model in the following section.
3.2 Explaining the success of new parties
Political parties thrive on electoral support. On the one hand, votes are the key
resource for party survival (Strøm, 1990). They are instrumental for the sustainability
2The Sweden Democrats competed at the Riksdag elections in 1988, 1991, 1994, 1998,
2002, and 2006 before achieving parliamentary representation in 2010.
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of party organizations, visibility, and capacity to mobilize other resources (such as
media attention) in subsequent elections. On the other hand, votes are essential for the
o ce- and policy-seeking activities of political parties. Parties enjoying strong support
at elections are generally more able to bring new issues into the political agenda,
influence policy within electoral channels, and a↵ect patterns of party competition.
The support that each political party enjoys in elections amounts to the aggregate
party choices of individual voters. Voters can be thought of as fully-informed rational
actors that seek to maximize their gains at any given election. Accordingly, they
cast the ballot for the political party they support the most, if the costs of voting do
not outweigh the benefits (Aldrich, 1993; Van der Brug et al., 2007). Voters assess
their propensity to support each of the available party alternatives considering a whole
range of factors. Prominent studies of voting behavior in comparative politics identify
three particularly influencing factors to this regard. First, the strategic concerns of
voters (e.g. Cox & Shugart, 1996; Cox, 1997; Gehlbach, 2013). Second, the electoral
demands of voters (Downs, 1957; Mair et al., 2004; Franzmann, 2011). Third, prevalent
economic conditions (e.g. Anderson, 2000; Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier, 2000; Van der Brug
et al., 2007). Our theoretical contribution hinges on these contributions, as well as on
previous developments in the literature on new party emergence, to grasp how each of
these factors a↵ects the success of new political parties.
3.2.1 Strategic considerations of voters
Electing a new party candidate requires voters to “change their behavior in a coordi-
nated fashion” (Lago & Mart´ınez, 2011: 6). However, large-scale voting coordination
towards new political parties is di cult to achieve. In western democracies, predictive
patterns of party competition and voting behavior, as well as widely publicized elec-
toral polls (Fey, 1997) facilitate the emergence of a coordinated equilibrium that favors
existing parties with proven viability records (Tavits, 2007).
The emergence of such an equilibrium prompts voters to develop strategic consid-
erations about the electoral viability of new parties. Under these circumstances, voters
strategically seek to improve the e↵ectiveness of their party choices in generating de-
sired political outcomes. To this purpose, voters frame expectations about the voting
decisions of other voters in upcoming elections and condition their party choices ac-
cordingly (Shepsle, 1997; Gehlbach, 2013). If voters do not find voter recoordination
favoring a party alternative likely, then they may transfer their support to party candi-
dates that actually have a realistic chance of getting elected (Cox, 1997: 30), provided
that the propensity to support that party is higher than the propensity to abstain.
According to the literature about new political parties, two factors determine the ex-
tent to which strategic considerations impede the success of new political parties: first,
constraining electoral institutions (Willey, 1998; Bolin, 2007; Selb & Pituctin, 2010).
Small constituencies, disproportional methods of seat allocation, and legal thresholds
all increase the size of voter coordination required to place a new candidate in the
legislature (Lago & Mart´ınez, 2011). These electoral rules then reduce the likelihood
for new candidates to achieve national representation in legislatures. This, in turn,
encourages voters to condition their party choices to only those alternatives likely to
get enough votes to surpass representation thresholds imposed by electoral institutions.
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Second, degree of party identification among the electorate (Tavits, 2007; Bischo↵,
2013). Crystalized support towards existing political parties reduces the likelihood
of large-scale recoordination favoring new competitors. Under such circumstances,
economic and issue considerations of voters become detached from party choices, thus
impeding newcomers to attract a large number of votes (Tavits, 2007; Dassonneville &
Hooghe, 2015). Accordingly, this creates incentives for rational voters to transfer their
support to deeply rooted existing parties instead of voting for new party candidates,
so as to prevent less desirable electoral outcomes (Cox, 1997: 10).
3.2.2 Electoral demands
The new party literature also recognizes the electoral demands of voters to be a major
determinant for the emergence of new competitors. In general terms, these studies
argue that unanswered electoral demands increase the pool of dissatisfied voters, thus
creating opportunities for new parties to emerge (Hauss & Rayside, 1978; Harmel &
Robertson, 1985; Hug, 2001; Tavits, 2008b; Zons, 2015).
This argument rests on the idea that voters and political parties compose an elec-
toral market subject to equilibrating mechanisms (Cox, 1997: 6). Voters support the
parties they expect to best respond to their electoral demands. Political parties, in
turn, attempt to identify and fulfill those demands. To this purpose, they convert
loose demands of the electorate into a coherent set of political issues (Easton, 1957;
Franzmann, 2011). Elections allow voters to determine which of these issues deserve
political attention. Therefore, periodic and competitive elections serve as equilibrating
market mechanism that promotes the responsiveness of political parties to the demands
of the electorate (Zons, 2015).
Electoral markets are rarely in equilibrium, though (Cox, 1997; Zons, 2015). Parties
are constrained in the range of policy positions they can adopt due to their ideological
and previous programmatic background (Kselman et al., 2016). Furthermore, they also
lack perfect information about the salience of current and future demands of voters,
and about the electoral consequences of responding to them (Hug, 1996, 2001). As a
result, they are not perfectly adaptable to emerging demands and fleeting issues (Hauss
& Rayside, 1978; Lago & Mart´ınez, 2011). This suggests that elections, while fostering
the responsiveness of political parties to the demands of voters, are frequently unable
to prevent market imbalances.
Lago & Mart´ınez (2011) and Riera & Russo (2016) refer to market imbalances as
‘electoral market failures’. These failures occur “when a significant number of individ-
uals are left dissatisfied by the partisan choices available to them” (Lago & Mart´ınez,
2011: 7). They claim that, under such circumstances, voters may either exchange their
support for new political parties, or refrain to participate in elections altogether. These
scholars do not identify, however, which circumstances lead the voters to select one way
of expressing their discontent over the other.
Following this rationale, however, we expect the propensity for dissatisfied voters
to support new parties to hinge on whether these competitors are able to identify and
embed unanswered demands into their programmatic o↵erings. This is not always the
case, though. New competitors may be more adaptable to changing demands as they
do not endure path dependent constraints similar to those of existing parties. Still, they
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lack perfect information about the salient demands of the electorate and their impact
in election outcomes. This implies that there seems to be two distinctive types of
electoral market failures, each of them prompting di↵erent responses from dissatisfied
voters:
1. Failures in the party system, whereby existing political parties fail to respond
to the electoral demands, while new parties e↵ectively manage to do so. Under
these circumstances, dissatisfied voters are more likely to support new party
competitors.
2. Failures in the electoral market as a whole, whereby all party contestants are
unable to incorporate salient electoral demands into their political programs.
Under these circumstances, dissatisfied voters are more likely to abstain.
3.2.3 General economic conditions
The impact of the state of the economy on election outcomes has been extensively
studied in the economic voting literature. In general, this literature claims that good
economic conditions benefit incumbent parties in elections, while bad economic con-
ditions hinder them. Nonetheless, despite sharing the same basic argument, existing
studies have yet to unequivocally define the precise nature of economic voting (Van der
Brug et al., 2007: 3). This body of research has enrolled in an extensive debate over
three prominent issues.
First, the direction by which voters hold the government accountable. Some authors
expect citizens to vote retrospectively, rewarding parties in o ce for good electoral
performance, and punishing them otherwise (e.g. Key, 1966). Others believe that
citizens vote prospectively, supporting the political party they expect to deliver better
economic performance in the short-run (e.g. Downs, 1957) regardless of past economic
conditions (Hibbs Jr., 2006).
Second, the di↵erent motivations behind economic voting. Several scholars stress
the role of sociotropic motivations, whereby voters take into account the general envi-
ronment of the country when casting the ballot (e.g. Kiewiet, 1984). However, some
other scholars argue that egotropic motivations drive economic voting instead. Accord-
ing to this view, voters consider their own financial situation when determining their
party choice (e.g. Nannestad & Paldam, 1995).
Finally, the economic aspects that underlie voting decisions. Most studies in the
literature focus on objective macroeconomic measures, such as GDP growth, inflation,
and unemployment rates (Van der Brug et al., 2007). Still, an important strand in the
literature considers aggregate perceptual evaluations of voters to be a more appropriate
method for describing their economic considerations in voting decisions (Lewis-Beck &
Stegmaier, 2000).
Ongoing debates about the nature of economic voting notwithstanding, these stud-
ies have found compelling evidence about the impact of economics in electoral out-
comes (e.g. Anderson, 2000, 2007; Van der Brug et al., 2007). Following this body
of research, scholars studying the emergence of new political parties adopted similar
theoretical claims. These scholars expect bad economic conditions to increase the like-
lihood of new party formation and success (e.g. Hug, 2001; Tavits, 2007, 2008a; Zons,
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2015; Kselman et al., 2016; Mainwaring et al., 2017). However, they have yet pro-
vide consistent evidence supporting this argument (see Chapter 2 for a more detailed
overview on this matter). While di↵erent data sources and modeling specifications
may explain these mixed findings (Selb & Pituctin, 2010: 149), we believe that prior
studies have incorrectly depicted the precise relationship between economic conditions
and the emergence of new political parties. Tavits hinted at this problem in previous
work. She states that:
(. . . ) even if incumbents are punished for poor economic performance,
it does not necessarily mean that new parties will profit, as voters may
also vote for existing opposition parties in order to punish the incumbent
(Tavits, 2007: 103-104)
Along these lines, prevalent economic conditions seem to support emergence of new
party competitors only when voters are dissatisfied with incumbent parties and existing
parties in opposition, as long as those new competitors answer to their electoral de-
mands. Hence, the relationship between economic performance and the success of new
parties appears not to be linear, as extant literature portrays, but rather conditioned
on other electoral demands of voters. Following this argument, we draw two hypotheses
that posit the interactive relationship between economic conditions and party system
failures on the success of new parties. We expect that:
Hypothesis 1 Unfavorable economic conditions increase the vote-share of new politi-
cal parties, if there is a significant market failure in the party system.
Hypothesis 2 Unfavorable economic conditions have no substantive impact on the
vote-share of new political parties, if there is no significant market imbalance in the
party system.
To test these hypotheses on empirical grounds, we now turn to discussing the op-
erationalization of these concepts and the methodological approach we use for data
analysis.
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4 Methodology
Our research seeks to explain the impact of the enabling factors outlined in the pre-
vious chapter on the emergence of new political parties in long-established western
democracies. These factors encompass voters’ strategic considerations, party system
failures, and economic conditions. Considering the scope of our research, we employed
a quantitative research design, based on statistical tests of regression analysis. We
believe that this design is appropriate to our research, as it allows us to estimate the
overall impact of these factors in a large number of observations across di↵erent polit-
ical systems and particular conjunctures. To this purpose, we created a dataset that
includes all the relevant variables for statistical tests. Given the extent of our study,
this dataset has a cross-sectional time-series data structure. Determining the unit of
observation of the dataset was not straightforward, however, as previous studies have
shown.
Some authors adopt elections in a given country (e.g. Bolin, 2007; Tavits, 2008a;
Kselman et al., 2016). They implicitly assume that new political parties all share a set
of relevant characteristics that distinguishes them from established parties. Individual
attributes, such as ideology, membership and financial resources, are exogenous to this
approach. The characteristics of new competitors may be specific to a political system
or a particular conjuncture. Thus, exogenizing these factors enhances comparability
across di↵erent contexts (Van der Brug et al., 2007). As a result, this unit of analysis
seems to provide a rather straightforward approach to assess the impact of election-level
and country-level factors on the success of new parties, particularly in cross-national
cross-time designs. However, parsimoniousness comes at a cost. Such approach is only
able to explain the aggregate success of new political parties.
Several authors address this shortcoming introducing a di↵erent unit of analysis, the
newly formed political parties themselves (e.g. Hug, 2001; Bolleyer & Bytzek, 2013).
In contrast to the former, this approach allows party-level factors to be included in
empirical models. Hence, they enable scholars to describe the emergence of each new
competitor and, thus, explain why some enjoy electoral success while others do not.
Still, as we have noted before, considering the attributes of individual parties hinders
comparability across di↵erent contexts.
This unit of analysis introduces an additional challenge to studies about new polit-
ical parties. They are often very small organizations. As such, information about their
individual characteristics is generally extremely scant. As a result, relying on existing
party-level data could lead to potential problems with selection bias, as information
about successful new competitors is more widely available. This is not problematic
in case and comparative studies, though (e.g. Selb & Pituctin, 2010; Riera & Russo,
2016). Scholars can devise theoretical reasons methodological tools that e↵ectively
address potential concerns about selection bias. Still, this is not attainable in large n
quantitative research designs. Hug (1996, 2001) illustrates this issue. While the author
employ the newly formed political parties as the basic unit of analysis, he fails to in-
clude party-level variables in his empirical models. This may lead to serious problems
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Country Elections
Austria 1999, 2002, 2006, 2008, 2013
Belgium 1981, 1985, 1987, 1991, 1995, 1999, 2003, 2007, 2010, 2014
Cyprus 2006, 2011
Denmark 1981, 1984, 1987, 1988, 1990, 1994, 1998, 2001, 2005, 2007, 2011, 2015
Finland 1995, 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011, 2015
France 1981, 1986, 1988, 1993, 1997, 2002, 2007, 2012
Germany 1983, 1987, 1990, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2005, 2009, 2013
Greece 1989, 1989, 1990, 1993, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2007, 2009, 2012, 2012, 2015,
2015
Ireland 1981, 1982, 1982, 1987, 1989, 1992, 1997, 2002, 2007, 2011
Italy 1983, 1987, 1992, 1994, 1996, 2001, 2006, 2008, 2013
Luxembourg 1984, 1989, 1994, 1999, 2004, 2009, 2013
Malta 2008, 2013
Netherlands 1981, 1982, 1986, 1989, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2003, 2006, 2010, 2012
Portugal 1987, 1991, 1995, 1999, 2002, 2005, 2009, 2011, 2015
Spain 1986, 1989, 1993, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2011, 2015
Sweden 1998, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014
UK 1983, 1987, 1992, 1997, 2001, 2005, 2010, 2015
Table 4.1: Universe of observations in the dataset
in statistical inference. At best, model provides ine cient results, as no information is
provided to explain di↵erent levels of the electoral support of each new political party
at any given election. At worst, results may inadvertently induce type I errors (i.e.
incorrect rejection of the null hypothesis), as the multiple observations unnecessarily
increase the degrees of freedom.
Given the scope of our study, and since individual characteristics of new political
parties have no theoretical relevance in our model, we believe that the time of each
election in a given country is a more appropriate unit of analysis to our research.
4.1 Case selection
Hinging on this unit of analysis, our database comprises all elections contested in 17
states of the European Union between 1980 and 2015 (see Table 4.1 for an overview of
the selected cases). This universe of observation shares several potential confounders
that could otherwise induce bias in our fidings.
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These 17 countries are all advanced industrial democracies, with a long democratic
history1 and an information-rich environment. Labels of existing parties, accurate
pre-election polling, as well as the coherence and identifiability of political parties’
programmatic campaign platforms (Tavits, 2008a; Kitschelt & Kselman, 2013) allow
voters to assess their propensity to support each of the available party alternatives, and
order their preferences accordingly. Additionally, these democracies display relatively
similar patterns of political conflict. The main dimension of political conflict in Western
European countries is the economic left-right (Coman, 2017). Further, the attitudes
towards European Union integration has become, in the recent decades, an increasingly
important political strain at the mass level (Van der Eijk & Franklin, 2004; De Vries,
2007). These similarities suggest that voter coordination in our sampled countries
follows somewhat comparable social and ideological strains.
The interval we selected also rests on the underlying assumptions of our model.
Crucially, until the late 1970s party systems and voting behavior had relatively stable
patterns. Voters were largely loyal to the party with which they identified, turning
out on election day to cast the ballot for it. Electoral competition dynamics were
thus more stable and centered around cleavage voting (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967). Since
the late 1980s, there has been an ever-growing partisanship dealignment, as voters
lessened their social and political ties to political parties (Dalton et al., 2000). Instead,
they increasingly relied on specific issues to form their party preferences (Kayser &
Wlezien, 2011). Sampling elections from 1980 onwards allows us to observe patterns
of voting behavior similar to those described in our theoretical model, with less noise
from cleavage voting.
4.2 From theory to data
Having determined the research design of our study, we now proceed operationalizing
the dependent variable, the success of new political parties, and the three enabling
factors outlined in Chapter 3. These are economic conditions, electoral demands and
strategic considerations of voters.
4.2.1 Success of new political parties
Operationalizing the dependent variable is pretty straightforward. As we discussed in
the previous chapter, the success of new political parties is, to a large extent, deter-
mined by the aggregate party choices of voters. Therefore, the vote-share of these new
competitors in each election seems to be an appropriate indicator to measure their
success.
We calculated this variable dividing the number of votes new political parties ob-
tained by the total number of valid votes for each given observation. Since comprehen-
sive databases seldom break down the full electoral results, we retrieved relevant data
from various sources that provided the most detailed information: websites of Gov-
ernmental and Statistical o ces, National Electoral Commissions, the data handbook
1To be sure, democratic history varies in our sample. The most recently democratized
country is Greece in the late 1970s.
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of Nohlen & Sto¨ver (2010), online resources of the Global Elections Database (Bran-
cati, 2017) (25 elections), and other miscellaneous sources (e.g. Boothroyd, 2009). We
provide a detailed list of these sources in Appendix 1.
Using the data we retrieved from these sources, we classified the observations that
met the criteria we set in Chapter 2 as new political parties. To recap, new parties (1)
never placed at least one of its candidates in a national legislature, regardless of their
circumstances of formation; (2) or emerge from minor parts that emerge from splits of
existing parties. We relied on Parlgov resources for this step (Do¨ring & Manow, 2016).
After classifying all observations in our database, we calculated the vote-share of new
parties dividing the number of votes those new competitors obtained by the total total
number of valid votes at each given election.
4.2.2 Strategic considerations
As we reviewed in Chapter 3, there are two prominent factors that drive voters to
behave strategically. First, constraining electoral institutions. This factor has been
extensively portrayed in the new party literature (e.g. Hauss & Rayside, 1978; Harmel
& Robertson, 1985; Willey, 1998; Hug, 2001; Bolin, 2007; Tavits, 2007; Selb & Pituctin,
2010; Hino, 2012). These studies consider constraining electoral institutions to hinder
the success of new political parties. Despite the ubiquity of this theoretical expectation,
however, authors rely on a number of di↵erent variables to measure the restrictiveness
of electoral systems. These include the type of party system, district magnitude, pro-
portionality of electoral formulas, as well as legal and e↵ective thresholds (see Chapter
2 for more details). Indeed, the di↵erent indicators employed in existing literature
reflect protracted debates about the role of distinct electoral rules in shaping of voter
responses in anticipation of their constraints (Cox, 1997; Benoit, 2006).
Since this debate is not of particular interest to this research, we adopted a fairly
standard variable portrayed in the literature about strategic voting, the size of electoral
districts. We calculate the average district magnitude in each country dividing the
number of parliamentary seats by the number of electoral districts. The relevant data
was retrieved from various sources, including Bolin (2007), Beck et al. (2001), and
Parlgov databases (Do¨ring & Manow, 2016).
Second, the strength of party identification among the electorate. In contrast with
the former, previous research has yet to explore its impact on the emergence of new
parties. Tavits (2007) tackled this issue using age of democracy as a proxy variable
for the crystallization of support for existing parties. The author expects crystallized
support to emerge over time as voters learn from past electoral records and adapt their
voting decisions accordingly. The impact of this variable considerably diminishes after
the first few elections, however, (Sartori, 1976) and is thus not particularly useful in
studies about long-established democracies. Moreover, the age of democracy is unable
to explain fluctuations in support for existing parties from election to election.
Accordingly, the literature seems to lack an appropriate indicator to measure the
strength of party identification among the electorate. Still, Bischo↵ (2013), researching
patterns of party system change, has developed an interesting contribution to this
regard. The author suggests that party identification decreases electoral volatily in
elections, as party choices remain relatively stable. As such, voters are able to look
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at aggregate changes in party support over past elections to determine the extent
to which voters identify with existing competitors. Low electoral volatility in past
elections thus signals large voting coordination favoring new parties to be less likely
and, therefore, hinders their prospective success. We retrieved electoral volatility data
from Chiaramonte & Emanuele (2017) database. The authors calculate this indicator
using the index developed by Pedersen (1979). We used this same index to calculate
missing observations relying on election data we collected for the dependent variable
to this end.
4.2.3 Electoral market failures and party system failures
Recent studies about new political parties suggest that electoral market failures fos-
ter new party emergence (Lago & Mart´ınez, 2011; Zons, 2015; Riera & Russo, 2016).
They all use the voter turnout in the previous election to measure the size these fail-
ures. These studies thus imply that decreasing voter participation in previous elections
inform new parties of a growing imbalance in the electoral market. This theoretical
contribution su↵ers from two basic problems, though.
First, voter turnout in previous elections may not provide an accurate signal about
the size of market failures to new political parties. Increasing abstention rates in past
elections also signal those failures to existing parties, that may e↵ectively answer to
electoral demands in their subsequent programatic o↵erings. Further, this measure
does not portray abrupt changes in the market equilibrium that may occur after the
previous election as the result of externalities such as the onset of widespread corruption
scandals. Hence, voter turnout bears a marginal role in signaling potential market
failures at subsequent elections. Rather, voter participation appears to be the outcome
of the size of those failures at any given election. Therefore, we believe that voter
turnout is an important indicator but only to control for electoral market imbalances
at each given election. We expect it to convey the extent to which party o↵erings are
able to respond to the electoral demands of the discontented voters. Assuming the
electoral support for existing parties to be constant, turnout is expected to increase
as new political parties are able to address the demands of voters that did not find
compelling reasons to support the existing parties. As such, higher voter turnout should
be associated with the success of new political parties. Considering this argument, we
included the non-lagged version of this variable in our model. We used Parlgov online
resources to retrieve the relevant data to our database (Do¨ring & Manow, 2016).
Second, voter turnout measures electoral market failures, but not party system fail-
ures. We introduced this second problem in Chapter 3. Previous studies fail to distin-
guish both types of failures and, consequently, their di↵ering impact in voting behavior.
In short, the former prompts voters to abstain. The latter drives voters to increasingly
support new party competitors. Misspecified theoretical considerations notwithstand-
ing, the literature about new political parties lacks an adequate operational variable to
measure the size of party system imbalances. Studies about democratic representation
(e.g. Downs, 1957; Huber & Powell, 1994; Stimson et al., 1995; Ezrow & Xezonakis,
2011), on the other hand, hint at an suitable indicator to this purpose: satisfaction
with democracy.
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This body of research considers political parties to be the main channel through
which voters express their electoral demands (Sartori, 1976). Consequently, parties are
a key institution, at least in western democracies, for political representation. Rep-
resentative party choice appears to have a positive e↵ect in the attitudes of citizens
towards the system (Aarts & Thomassen, 2008), and thus fosters satisfaction with
democracy. Then, the literature about democratic representation holds that “citizen
satisfaction is enhanced when public policy reflects the preferences of the mean voter”
(Ezrow & Xezonakis, 2011: 1152-1153). Ezrow & Xezonakis (2011) provide strong
statistical evidence supporting this normative claim.
According to this rationale, we expect increasing satisfaction to democracy to hin-
der the success of new political parties, and vice-versa. Accordingly, we added to our
database Eurobarometer survey results for the mean value of satisfaction with democ-
racy of a representative sample of citizens of each country since 1980. This value ranges
in a scale from 1 to 4, based on the following question:
On the whole, are you very satisfied (4), fairly satisfied (3), not very satisfied
(2), or not at all satisfied (1) with the way democracy works in our country?
Each entry in our database corresponds to the last Eurobarometer datum available
before each election date. We retrieved this data from Portal de Opinia˜o Pu´blica (2017)
for observations from 1986 onwards, and Schmitt et al. (2008) for earlier observations.
Both sources compile Eurobarometer survey results.
4.2.4 Economic conditions
As we indicated in the previous chapter, the economic voting literature has developed
an extensive debate over the precise impact of the economic conditions in party choice.
As a result, this body of research has relied on a considerable array of indicators
to measure these conditions. These include gross domestic product (GDP) growth,
unemployment, inflation, as well as retrospective and prospective economic perceptions,
that hinge on either egotropic or sociotropic motivations. The new party literature,
however, has yet to take on a similar debate. To be sure, studies about new extreme
right-wing political parties focus on unemployment rates (e.g. Jackman & Volpert,
1996; Golder, 2003; Van der Brug et al., 2005). Still, the remaining literature strands
primarily use GDP growth to measure economic conditions (e.g. Tavits, 2007; Kselman
et al., 2016; Riera & Russo, 2016).
We adopt this same indicator so as to ensure some degree of comparability with
extant empirical findings. We calculated this variable using data about GDP per capita
at purchasing power parity (PPP) from the International Monetary Found’s website
(IMF DataMapper, 2017). Having depicted the case selection, unit of analysis and the
operational variables, we proceed in the next chapter with descriptive and inferential
data analysis.
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5 The Success of New Parties:
Empirical Evidence
We use linear regression models fitted to panel data to test the theoretical expectations
outlined in Chapter 3. These models are particularly appropriate to our research given
that the universe of observations entails a time-series cross-national data structure and
that the dependent variable can take any value within its theoretical range, thereby
fitting into a continuous distribution. The panel structure of the dataset is likely to
introduce heteroskedastic errors and autocorrelation within, but not across, countries
(Stimson, 1985; Cameron & Miller, 2013). Indeed, residual-versus-fitted and country-
time-series residual plots exhibit patterns consistent with both types of spherical errors.
As such, we clustered standard errors by country. Clustered errors are heteroskedastic
and autocorrelation consistent, and thus permit relaxing both assumptions of linear
least-squares estimates (Cameron & Miller, 2013).
Table 5.1 provides a list and standard descriptive statistics of the operational vari-
ables included in our database. The dependent variable, the vote-share of new political
parties in each election follows a long-tailed, positively skewed distribution, with most
of its observations clustering below the mean (see Figure 5.1). The average vote-share
of new political parties is 5.86 per cent, only surpassing 30 per cent in three elections
(Greece in May 2012, Italy in 2013, and Spain in 2015). Only three electoral contests,
all of them in Denmark, recorded no new competitors.
These data appear to corroborate some of our theoretical considerations. Equili-
brating market mechanisms and incentives for voter coordination impede, to a large
extent, the success of new political parties (hence the heavy skewness towards the low
spectrum of the possible theoretical range). Still, these mechanisms seldom guarantee
perfect balance between the electoral demands of voters and the programmatic supply
of existing parties. This preliminary analysis also suggests that structural di↵erences
Indicators mean st.dev min max n
Vote-share of new parties 5.86 7.13 0 41.23 135
GDP per capita PPP 4.2 3.22 -6.53 12.95 135
Satisfaction with democracy 2.6 0.34 1.7 3.4 135
Voter turnout 77.13 9.77 55.8 94.54 135
Average magnitude 20.01 39.29 1 150 135
Electoral volatility (lag) 11.21 6.58 0.08 43.8 135
Table 5.1: Descriptive statistics
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in political systems may explain, at least to some degree, the vote-share of new parties.
This, in turn, requires us to employ appropriate statistical instruments to control for
these di↵erences.
We set four di↵erent model specifications. The first two estimate the linear e↵ect
of economic growth on the vote-share of new parties. The remaining two add an
interaction term to test the conditional impact of economic growth on the electoral
success of these new competitors at di↵erent levels of satisfaction with democracy.
The partial models thus include two main independent variables: economic growth
(or more precisely, the year-over-year change in gross domestic product per capita at
purchasing power parity), and average satisfaction with democracy prior to the electoral
contests. These variables are also the constitutive terms for the interaction e↵ect
included in the conditional model specifications. We standardized satisfaction with
democracy using z-scores to address an expected increase in multicollinearity levels
when introducing the interaction term (see the last section of this chapter for more
details). The full additive and conditional specifications also include the remaining
operational variables described in Chapter 4: voter turnout, the electoral volatility in
the previous election, and the average magnitude of electoral districts. We applied a
logarithmic transformation to this last variable to account for its diminishing marginal
impact on the dependent variable (Lago & Mart´ınez, 2011).
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Figure 5.1: Frequency of the dependent variable
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5.1 Discussion
Table 5.2 presents the results for the regression models positing the linear relationship
between economic growth and the vote-share of new political parties. Controlling for
all factors discussed in Chapter 3, the full model appears to be a better fit over the
partial model. The electoral volatility in the previous elections has a significant e↵ect
on the dependent variable. New political parties seem to benefit from higher volatility
in aggregate party choices, as voters are more likely to transfer their support between
party alternatives over di↵erent elections. The remaining control variables in the full
model specifications provide less encouraging results, though. Both the voter turnout
and the average magnitude of electoral districts seem to have no influence on the vote-
share of new party competitors.
The impact of the main explanatory variables on the electoral success of new en-
trants is pretty consistent across both the partial and full estimates. Satisfaction with
democracy is significant and negatively associated with the dependent variable. This
means that the electoral success of the new competitors is lower the more satisfied
voters are with the way democracy works. The full model reports that an unit increase
in satisfaction with democracy reduces the support for new entrants by 3.31 percentage
points. This strongly supports the argument of existing studies about democratic rep-
resentation that the attitudes of voters towards the system shape the extent to which
they support new political parties (Aarts & Thomassen, 2008).
Variables Partial Model Full Model
Economic growth
 0.22
(0.21)
 0.27
(0.22)
Satisfaction with democracy
 3.27⇤⇤⇤
(0.68)
 3.31⇤⇤⇤
(0.60)
Voter turnout
0.08
(0.06)
Average magnitude (log)
 0.83
(0.96)
Electoral volatility (lag)
0.21⇤⇤⇤
(0.05)
↵
6.81⇤⇤⇤
(1.19)
 0.41
(4.71)
R2 0.24 0.28
n 135 135
Linear regression panel estimates. Robust standard errors ad-
justed for clustering by country in parentheses.
⇤p0.05, ⇤⇤p0.01, ⇤⇤⇤p0.001
Table 5.2: Additive model specifications
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Economic growth, on the other hand, seems to have no explanatory power on the
dependent variable. This finding, coupled with the inconsistent empirical evidence
reported in extant literature (see Chapter 2 for more details), suggest that there is
no clear direct relationship between economic growth and the electoral success of new
parties. As noted before, bad economic conditions do not necessarily assist new en-
trants, as voters may rather support opposition parties to punish incumbents (Tavits,
2007). As such, new competitors only truly benefit from bad economic conjunctures if
voters are dissatisfied with existing party alternatives. Indeed, the conditional models
we performed seem to support this argument.
Table 5.3 reports the results for these models. They assess the impact of economic
growth on new party success taking into account the overall satisfaction with democ-
racy among voters. The estimates include an interaction e↵ect to test this contingent
relationship. It is worth noting, however, that the interaction term makes the e↵ect of
an explanatory variable on the dependent variable hinge on a third variable. Therefore,
directly interpreting the results reported in Table 5.3 for its constitutive terms should
be avoided, as they capture the unconditional impact of those terms on the dependent
variable (Brambor et al., 2005: 7). Properly interpreting these results instead requires
analyzing the marginal e↵ects of economic growth on the vote-share of new parties
over di↵erent levels of satisfaction with democracy. We plotted these marginal e↵ects
in Figure 5.2 for the partial model, and Figure 5.3 for the full model.
Variables Partial Model Full Model
Economic growth
 0.15
(0.17)
 0.20
(0.16)
Satisfaction with democracy
 4.57⇤⇤⇤
(1.21)
 4.80⇤⇤⇤
(1.17)
Economic growth ⇥
Satisfaction with democracy
0.46⇤⇤
(0.15)
0.48⇤⇤
(0.16)
Voter turnout
0.11
(0.06)
Average magnitude (log)
 1.19
(1.03)
Electoral volatility (lag)
0.21⇤⇤⇤
(0.05)
↵
6.21⇤⇤⇤
(1.14)
 3.43
(4.80)
R2 0.29 0.34
n 135 135
Linear regression panel estimates. Robust standard errors ad-
justed for clustering by country in parentheses.
⇤p0.05, ⇤⇤p0.01, ⇤⇤⇤p0.001
Table 5.3: Conditional model specifications
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For the most part, the interactive relationship holds remarkably similar in both
estimates. Their respective figures show that a percentage point increase in GDP per
capita growth diminishes the vote-share of new entrants when the electorate is unsat-
isfied with the way democracy works.1 By extension, this means that a percentage
point decrease in economic growth fosters the electoral success of new competitors.
This relationship appears to be quite substantive. At the lowest levels of satisfaction
with democracy, such unfavorable changes in economic conditions lead to a surge in the
support for new parties by as much as 1.5 percentage points (Figure 5.3). These find-
ings corroborate our first hypothesis. Adverse macroeconomic conjunctures allow new
political parties to achieve greater electoral success if there is a considerable imbalance
in the electoral market.
The impact of economic conditions diminishes as the satisfaction with democracy
increases. Nevertheless, both figures 5.2 and 5.3 suggest that favorable changes in the
general economy do actually benefit new political parties when voters are very satisfied
with the way democracy works. This relationship appears barely reaches significant
levels at 95 per cent confidence intervals. Still, this finding opposes our second hy-
pothesis, that bad economic conditions have no e↵ect on the emergence of new parties
when there is no considerable supply-demand gap in the electoral market. Nevertheless,
these findings clearly convey that the e↵ect of economic performance on the success
of new parties is not additive, as cross-national studies have implicitly portrayed in
empirical analyses, but rather conditional to a second explanatory variable, related to
party system failures.
Turning to the remaining variables, the reported results seem congruent with those
of the full additive model. The lag of electoral volatility remains significant and in the
expected direction. A percentage point increase is associated with a 0.21 percentage
points increase in support for new party entrants. This supports the idea that electoral
volatility in the previous elections do inform voters about the strategies of others in
upcoming electoral contests. Higher volatily means less attachment to political parties,
which consequently decreases the strategic concerns of voters about the viability of the
new parties.
Voter turnout seems to have little influence on the electoral success of new party
competitors. Nonetheless, the expected relationship seems to follow that of the pre-
dicted relationship, that higher voter turnout is associated with increases in the vote-
share of new political parties.
Lastly, the log of average magnitude of electoral districts is also not a significant
predictor of new party success. This finding is hardly novel in extant literature (e.g.
Kselman et al., 2016). Several authors suggest that inconsistent evidence may result
from not accounting for several other features of electoral systems that may influence
its permissiveness at the national-level. These include legal thresholds, the size of na-
tional assemblies, upper-tier corrections, institutional incentives for party coordination
across districts, and the geographical distribution of electoral groups (Selb & Pituctin,
2010: 149). Some scholars have attempted to develop indicators to weight the for-
mal constraints of electoral systems at the national level. The nationwide threshold
1We labeled the x-coordinate units in Figure 5.2 and Figure 5.3 using the non-
standardized values.
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Figure 5.2: Partial conditional model – interaction e↵ect
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Figure 5.3: Full conditional model – interaction e↵ect
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of representation, developed by Taagepera (2002) is a notable example in this regard.
However, these developments are still in their infancy. Current measures do not en-
compass all the aforementioned factors that might be relevant to define institutional
openness. To be sure, we retested all estimates replacing the average magnitude with
this threshold. We found no substantial changes worth reporting. Considering these
theoretical and empirical shortcomings, we believe that future research should address
the lack of a comprehensive measure of the permissiveness of electoral system at a
nation-level (Selb & Pituctin, 2010: 156) to then predict its impact on the success of
new parties.
5.2 Robustness tests
The interaction e↵ects added to the conditional model specifications allowed us to test
whether the impact of the economy on the success of new parties was dependent on
the satisfaction with democracy among the electorate. Some complications may arise
from including interaction terms in statistical models, though. In particular, they
entail the possibility for multicollinearity, which may substantially change coe cient
estimates. As such, we performed uncentered variance inflation factors tests (VIF tests)
to evaluate this concern prior to estimating our models.
Variables Model
Economic growth
 0.17
(0.16)
Satisfaction with democracy
 3.76⇤⇤⇤
(1.16)
Economic growth ⇥
Satisfaction with democracy
0.56⇤⇤
(0.17)
Voter turnout
0.02
(0.09)
Average magnitude (log)
 1.52
(1.75)
Electoral volatility (lag)
0.11⇤
(0.05)
↵
 2.29
(7.11)
R2 0.25
n 135
Linear regression panel estimates. Robust standard errors
adjusted for clustering by country in parentheses.
⇤p0.05, ⇤⇤p0.01, ⇤⇤⇤p0.001
Table 5.4: Full conditional model with fixed e↵ects
35
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
E
ff
ec
ts
 o
n
 L
in
ea
r 
P
re
d
ic
ti
on
1.7 2.6 (mean) 3.4
Satisfaction with Democracy
Figure 5.4: Full conditional model with fixed e↵ects – interaction e↵ect
As expected, we found extremely high levels of multicollinearity in the conditional
models. To address this issue, we standardized one of the constitutive interaction terms,
satisfaction with democracy, using z-score transformations. Retesting VIF yielded
results quite analogous to those of additive model specifications and well within the
acceptable range (below 10). Average VIF in the full conditional model reported above
is 3.74, with the higher value being 7.96 for voter turnout.
Since this interaction e↵ect is arguably the main theoretical contribution of our
thesis, we also sought to test its robustness in the presence of potential cofounders
of satisfaction with democracy. We performed several estimates which added another
interaction term. This term estimated the e↵ect of economic growth on the success of
new parties contingent on various variables that are thought to be correlated with sat-
isfaction with democracy. These include age of democracy (and its log), the number of
previous parliamentary elections, GDP, GDP per capita, voter turnout, and polariza-
tion. The added interaction terms for GDP and GDP per capita appear to increase the
significancy of the main interaction e↵ect at high levels of satisfaction with democracy,
whereas the term for polarization decreases its significancy. These changes, however,
seem not to have any substantive impact on the results depicted above, in the full
conditional model. The remaining estimates hold similar patterns to those observed in
said model, as well.
Finally, we attempted to assess the extent to which unobserved heterogeneity at
country-level a↵ects preceding estimates. This is particularly concerning given that
the descriptive analysis of the dependent variable hinted structural di↵erences among
36
di↵erent countries may explain, at least to a certain extent, the electoral success of
new parties. To address this concern, we performed two di↵erent tests.
First, we carried out seventeen estimates of the full conditional model, adding a
dummy variable for each country at a time. Overall, this test captured significant
structural factors in six countries. These factors seem to increase the vote-share of
new political parties in Austria, France, and Italy. Conversely, they appear to hinder
the success of the new entrants in Belgium, Germany, and Portugal. Notwithstand-
ing, we found no notable changes in estimated results for the other variables. Voter
turnout did become a significant predictor of new party success at 95 per cent con-
fidence level when introducing dummies for Belgium, as well as France. Its impact
remains positive, thus providing some feeble evidence to support our theoretical claim
that higher turnout levels are associated with the electoral success of new party com-
petitors. Furthermore, we retested the final model with fixed e↵ects to check whether
the independent variables were correlated within clusters (Table 5.4.). Unsurprisingly,
we found the impact of turnout on new party success to drop considerably, as formal
institutions and electoral rules of political systems do play an important role in deter-
mining its size (Jackman, 1987; Blais & Carty, 1990; Blais, 2006). Still, satisfaction
with democracy and the electoral volatily in previous elections remained significant at
99 and 95 per cent confidence levels, respectively. Lastly, the interaction shows similar
findings to those of the partial and full models with no fixed e↵ects. Marginal e↵ects
also suggest that increases in economic growth do actually soar the vote-share for new
political parties when the electorate is satisfied with the way democracy works. This
further reinforces prior evidence rejecting our second hypothesis, that economic con-
ditions have no impact on the success of new entrants when the electoral market is in
equilibrium.
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6 Conclusion
This dissertation sought to evaluate how economics influence the the emergence of
new political parties. We hypothesized that new entrants benefit from bad economic
conditions if voters are discontented with existing parties. In contrast, we expected the
economy to have no meaningful e↵ect on the electoral success of new competitors if
voters, on the other hand, are generally satisfied with existing party alternatives. Our
findings support the former hypothesis, but also suggest some opposing evidence with
regards to the later. It seems that economic growth is actually advantageous to new
political parties when there is no significant imbalance between the electoral demands
of voters and the political o↵erings of existing parties.
Despite this counterintuitive finding, the results reported in Chapter 5 support
the idea that the precise impact of the state of the general economy on new party
success depends on the size of party system imbalances. This explains why previous
cross-national studies have not found compelling evidence supporting the economic
voter hypothesis. These studies did not portray this interactive relationship, focusing
instead on the unconditional impact of the economic conjuncture on the electoral for-
tune of the new entrants. These results add to a series of other conceptual, theoretical,
methodological, and empirical contributions introduced throughout the dissertation.
With regard to the conceptual contributions, we devised a novel classification to
define ‘new electoral competitors’. These competitors comprise all political parties that
contest elections but have yet to place at least one of their candidates into the national
legislatures. This definition hinges on the seminal study of Pedersen (1982) on the
major milestones of party lifespans, and thus disposes of self-selected categorizations
and discretionary cuto↵ points presented in the various definitions proposed in previous
studies.
We further identified the circumstances of formation that distinguish genuinely new
political parties from other types of new electoral competitors. This classification rests
on considerations about the expected impact of the new entrant on party and elec-
toral competition. We considered start-up organizations and minor splits of existing
parties to be genuinely new political parties as they destabilize established patterns of
party competition and attempt to take advantage of failures in the electoral market
to mobilize voters. The impact of these competitors contrast with those that emerge
from mergers, electoral alliances, and reorganizations of former parties. These new
entrants seek to prevent market failures in the first place, and cartelize electoral com-
petition around already established political actors. As such, we did not consider these
circumstances of formation to form genuinely new political parties.
Turning to the theoretical contributions, we emphasized the inadequacy of existing
theoretical frameworks to explain the success of new political parties. These frameworks
primarily deal with new party formation and therefore focus on the strategic considera-
tions of rational political actors in explaining entry decisions. The proponents of these
frameworks argue that these entry decisions hinge on prospective electoral success, thus
allowing their models to provide a proper understanding about this phenomenon (Hug,
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2001; Tavits, 2007; Zons, 2015). While this makes for a compelling argument, simple
descriptive evidence suggests no link between entry decisions and electoral success (see
Chapter 3). Taking this into account, we devised a new theoretical model that rests
on the voting decisions of citizens, i.e. the actors that directly determine the electoral
success of new entrants.
Owing to this model, we hypothesized the interactive relationship between eco-
nomics and market failures in explaining new party success. We also noticed a preem-
inent flaw in previous studies devising theoretical frameworks around market failures.
These studies failed to identify two distinctive types of failures. First, imbalances in
the party system, whereby voters are dissatisfied with the existing partisan choices.
Second, imbalances in the electoral market as a whole, whereby voters are discontent
with all party alternatives available to them, including new competitors. This distinc-
tion is highly important, as these di↵erent market failures cause voters to express their
discontent with two possible ways. The former prompt them to support new political
parties; the latter to abstain.
In respect to the methodological contributions, we emphasized the obstacles in us-
ing the new political parties as the basic unit of observation in cross-national designs.
Information about the individual characteristics of the new competitors is exiguous,
because the new entrants are often small and transient, with hardly any substantial
impact in politics. This greatly hinders the feasibility of cross-national studies which
seek to include party-level variables in their statistical analyses (at least without re-
curring to a self-selected sample). Considering this shortcoming, we used elections as
the basic unit of analysis in our research.
The main empirical contributions of this dissertation rest on the aforementioned
contingent nature of the relationship between economic growth and new party success.
Nonetheless, we also introduced new operational variables that proved quite influential
in explaining the extent to which new entrants benefit from electoral outcomes: sat-
isfaction with democracy (weighing the size of party system failures); and the lag of
electoral volatility (measuring the strength of voters’ a liation with existing parties).
The operationalization of these enabling factors hinged on the theoretical and empirical
underpinnings of other literature strands in political science.
The literature about democratic representation provides the foundation to the for-
mer variable. This strand asserts that representative party choice has a positive e↵ect
on the attitudes of citizens towards the system, thereby increasing overall satisfaction
of voters with the way democracy works (Aarts & Thomassen, 2008; Ezrow & Xezon-
akis, 2011). Our findings suggest high satisfaction with democracy to diminish the
vote-share for new political parties.
In turn, some recent work in the literature on party system change supports the
rationale for the latter variable, the electoral volatility in previous elections. Unstable
patterns of voting behavior signals voters about the chance for voter recoordination fa-
voring new political parties (Bischo↵, 2013) in the presence of electoral market failures.
Conversely, voters expect such recoordination to be less likely when electoral outcomes
remain stable across elections, as voters appear more attached to their traditional party
choices. Our findings corroborate this argument as well, suggesting that high electoral
volatility increase the vote-share of new entrants.
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Interestingly, we did not find compelling evidence linking voter turnout and the
average district magnitude, two widely used variables in extant literature, to the success
of new political parties. In particular, the exiguous evidence about the impact of the
latter variable seems to derive from the lack of truly comprehensive measures of the
mechanical constraints imposed by electoral rules (Selb & Pituctin, 2010). Indeed, the
indicators we tested, average magnitude of electoral districts and e↵ective thresholds,
do not control for a myriad of other factors that may influence the nationwide openness
of electoral systems.
These weak findings join a methodological shortcoming posed in our study. Using
elections as the basic unit of analysis, the empirical tests can only explain the aggre-
gate success of new political parties. Therefore, they are unable to assess why some
new parties success while others do not. To be fair, this is not theoretically relevant
to our research question. However, previous studies have already suggested that the
characteristics of new political parties do actually influence whether they can achieve
electoral success (e.g. Lucardie, 2000; Golder, 2003; Bolleyer & Bytzek, 2013). This
means that this modeling strategy can potentially lead to type 1 errors if the character-
istics of the new competitors are potential confounders or, at the very least, correlated
with the enabling election-level and country-level drivers of new party success. As
such, we believe that further research should attempt to test the hypotheses depicted
in Chapter 3 in comparative studies of parties that share common attributes, and in
case studies focusing on individual political parties. These research designs remove
unobserved heterogeneity at the party-level thus allowing to test the robustness of the
aforementioned theoretical expectations, that the impact of the economy on the success
of new political party depends on the extent to which voters are dissatisfied with the
o↵erings of existing parties.
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List of Sources of Electoral Data
Country Year Source Retrieved
Austria 1999 Brancati (2017) 27/02/2017
Austria 2002 Brancati (2017) 27/02/2017
Austria 2006 Brancati (2017) 27/02/2017
Austria 2008 Brancati (2017) 27/02/2017
Austria 2013 Austrian Federal Ministry of the Interior 27/02/2017
Belgium 1981 Belgium Electoral Commission 27/02/2017
Belgium 1985 Belgium Electoral Commission 27/02/2017
Belgium 1987 Belgium Electoral Commission 27/02/2017
Belgium 1991 Belgium Electoral Commission 27/02/2017
Belgium 1995 Belgium Electoral Commission 27/02/2017
Belgium 1999 Belgium Electoral Commission 27/02/2017
Belgium 2003 Belgium Electoral Commission 27/02/2017
Belgium 2007 Service public fe´de´ral Inte´rieur 27/02/2017
Belgium 2010 Service public fe´de´ral Inte´rieur 27/02/2017
Belgium 2014 Service public fe´de´ral Inte´rieur 27/02/2017
Cyprus 2006 Cypriot Ministry of the Interior 27/02/2017
Cyprus 2011 Cypriot Ministry of the Interior 27/02/2017
Denmark 1981 Nohlen and Sto¨ver (2010)
Denmark 1984 Nohlen and Sto¨ver (2010)
Denmark 1987 Nohlen and Sto¨ver (2010)
Denmark 1988 Nohlen and Sto¨ver (2010)
Denmark 1990 Nohlen and Sto¨ver (2010)
Denmark 1994 Nohlen and Sto¨ver (2010)
Denmark 1998 Nohlen and Sto¨ver (2010)
Denmark 2001 Nohlen and Sto¨ver (2010)
Denmark 2005 Nohlen and Sto¨ver (2010)
Denmark 2007 Nohlen and Sto¨ver (2010)
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Denmark 2011 Statistics Denmark 27/02/2017
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